The February 2021 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan came as something of a bolt from the blue. Nobody really expected such a development at that time. Relations between India and Pakistan, never good at the best of times, had taken a sharp downturn after the constitutional reforms in Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019. Pakistanis had launched what they thought was a blistering global propaganda campaign against India, directing it personally against the Indian leadership. The bitterness between the two sides had reached a point where it seemed even a civilised conversation was no longer possible. It was against this bilateral setting that the Director General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of the two countries “agreed to address each other’s core issues and concerns which have the propensity to disturb the peace and lead to violence. Both sides agreed to strict observance of all agreements, understandings and cease firing along the Line of Control and all other sectors”.
At that time, the commentariat, which was utterly clueless about what was being worked out on the back channel between the two adversaries, suddenly acted all knowledgeable about what prompted this agreement. On both sides of the Radcliffe Line, it was almost like an epiphany that the thaw was prompted by India’s growing discomfiture over the deteriorating situation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. Convinced that India was trying to defuse the LoC in order to avoid getting caught in a two-front situation with both Pakistan and China acting in collusion, no one really bothered to ask what was in it for Pakistan to agree to the ceasefire, especially since it meant bailing out India? After all, given the state of relations, Pakistan would have revelled in India’s predicament of being simultaneously engaged on two fronts.
The simple reason why Pakistan wanted the ceasefire was because it needed it, perhaps even more than India. Pakistan agreed to the ceasefire not for India’s sake but because it served Pakistan’s interests; the converse was true in India’s case. In other words, both sides entered into a ceasefire because it suited them, not because they were trying to be nice or cute to the other side. For the Pakistanis, there were compelling reasons to cool things down with India. Recently, Pakistani journalists revealed that Pakistan’s former Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa had admitted to Pakistani media personnel in 2021 that the Pakistan Army was in no state to fight a war against India. According to Bajwa, the Pakistan Army faced serious equipment and logistics problems – the tanks and aircraft were in bad shape, fuel supplies were running short, the economy was running on fumes and the treasury was empty. Inflation was rising, energy prices were out of control, the rupee was under pressure, and the budgets of the armed forces had been virtually frozen. Pakistan could certainly defend itself against an Indian attack but it would be insane to initiate a war against India. Even the ceasefire violations along the LoC were proving ruinous. The bottom line was that continued confrontation and open hostility was proving unaffordable and Pakistan needed an honourable off-ramp.
Apart from the economic crunch, there was a drift in governance. Meanwhile, the security situation was uncertain. The end game had started in Afghanistan. Pakistan expected a flood of refugees. There was no clarity on whether Afghanistan would descend into a civil war that would suck in Pakistan. The last thing Pakistan needed in such an uncertain state of affairs was an active eastern front with India. As things turned out, even though there was no civil war or flood of refugees from Afghanistan, there was a new wave of terrorism that came into Pakistan. That the ceasefire came as a boon for Pakistan, which is now contending with multiple crises, is a no-brainer.
To the credit of Gen Qamar Bajwa, he had shown the foresight to anticipate how things might turn out in 2021 and took steps that he thought were best for his country. The fact that some of these steps suited India was incidental. Even so, the convergence of interests in cooling things down was what led to both sides agreeing to a ceasefire. Both countries have since used the peace along LoC to their advantage. They have beefed up their defences, and repaired and strengthened their bunkers and other defensive structures. And both sides were able to focus on fronts which presented immediate threats – Pakistan to its West and its internal crises; India to the threat from the East and North, along the Chinese frontier.
Gen Bajwa also realised that Pakistan needed to climb out of the hole in which it found itself. The excesses of the past reduced Pakistan into a banana republic. What Pakistan needed was peace and a modicum of normalisation with India. This didn’t mean kissing and making up with India. Instead, under Bajwa, the Pakistani military seemed to have come around to the view (partly under Chinese tutelage) to open up trade relations with India as that would go a long distance in helping the broken Pakistani economy. Pakistanis felt that they could operate on parallel tracks – have a fruitful economic relationship while maintaining their position on the disputes with India. Whether this would have worked is another matter. But at least on the economic front, Pakistan stood to gain. Take for instance the fact that Pakistan has faced a huge crisis in procuring cotton. The cotton crop has failed for the last three years, forcing Pakistan to import cotton which forms around 60 percent of its exports. Importing from India was not only cheaper but also quicker. But a ban on trade meant that Pakistan was forced to import expensive cotton which in turn affected the competitiveness of Pakistani exports. Same with wheat, pharmaceuticals, and a range of other products. Under Bajwa, the Pakistan Army seems to have realised that cutting its nose to spite India’s face wasn’t exactly a wise thing to do. The problem, however, was that Bajwa’s sensible policy was stymied and sabotaged by Imran Khan.
As things stand, it isn’t clear if Bajwa’s successor will operate along the rational and pragmatic policy framework crafted by his predecessor, or if he will try to reinvent the wheel and repeat the same old mistakes of the past. So far the jury is out on this question. The recent clarification issued by the military spokesman on Bajwa’s remarks needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. After all, no army will accept in public that it is in no position to fight and sustain a war with a larger adversary. Doing that would be tantamount to a public surrender. Hence, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) chief said what was pretty pro forma – we will take the war into the enemy’s territory. The sound byte was fine but it really fooled no one. If indeed the Pakistan Army can take the war into Indian territory, then perhaps it should first do a test run in Afghanistan, where it is facing relentless and remorseless terror attacks.
For the foreseeable future, given the political uncertainty inside Pakistan, the prospect of any forward movement to normalise things between the two adversaries appears rather bleak. Gen Asim Munir seems to be struggling to establish his writ on the divided Pakistan Army. There is an apprehension that in order to rally the country and the Army, Munir, who is a former MI and ISI chief, might try to indulge in some adventurism against India. But given the risks involved, this could easily backfire on him and his country.
Alternatively, he could stick to Bajwa’s template and keep the peace with India. The latter would be the rational thing to do. Under Bajwa, the Pakistan Army proved that it could think in a rational framework. But past history also suggests that Pakistan Army can also indulge in some irrational action, which from its perspective, is perfectly rational. The next few weeks and months will make it clear whether Bajwa succeeded in bringing a paradigm change in the Pakistan Army perspective, or that rationality was merely a flash in the pan.
The writer is Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation. Views expressed are personal.
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