The year 2016 marked a significant upswing in the Nepal-China relationship. Angered by the imposition of the so-called ‘blockade’ during September 2015-February 2016 that led to shortages of fuel, gas and other commodities in Nepal, Prime Minister Oli decided to make a huge outreach to China. And China reciprocated in full measure. It signed a slew of long-term agreements ranging from transit arrangements for Nepal’s third country trade through Chinese ports to multibillion dollar trans-Himalayan connectivity projects. Is there a renewed convergence of interests between Nepal and China that underpins this cooperation? Is this largely a backlash against India’s policy in Nepal, or are other factors at work too?
The Nepal-China relationship has evolved over time. In the early years after Indian independence, the Rana leadership was anxious about the communist takeover of China in 1949 and Tibet the following year. It was worried about the implications for Nepal’s own security since the Tibetan buffer had disappeared and Nepal had a direct border with Communist China. Nepal was fearful of the assertion attributed to Chairman Mao that Tibet is the right palm of China and its five fingers are Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA (North East Frontier Association, now the state of Arunachal Pradesh). The fingers had been connected to Tibet in one way or another. In earlier times, Nepal had a robust relationship with Tibet, had engaged in wars and even paid tributes to the Chinese Emperor. The forging of the India-Nepal Friendship Treaty in 1950 should be seen against this background. It placed Nepal squarely within India’s security umbrella. Within the Government of India too, there was both a worry about China’s activities in the Himalayan region as well as a desire to forge a new relationship with China in the context of Asian solidarity. Sardar Patel had written a famous letter to Pandit Nehru in November 1950, highlighting the Chinese threat along the Himalayan frontier and recommended a series of steps that should be taken by India. The establishment of seventeen checkposts along the Nepal–China border was one of the measures taken with Nepalese consent to step up vigilance along the Himalayas.
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However, the Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai phase began soon thereafter with the signing of the famous Panchsheel Pact between India and China in 1954, leading up to the Bandung Asian African Solidarity Conference the next year. Nepal, too, established diplomatic relations with China in 1955. Prime Minister B.P. Koirala’s visit to China in March 1960 expedited work on a Boundary Agreement and a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the two countries. The relationship received a further boost after the abolition of multiparty democracy by King Mahendra in 1960. As India was critical of King Mahendra’s actions, Nepal turned to China and signed important treaties and agreements, including one demarcating the border and another relating to the construction of the Khasa (Zhangmu)-Kathmandu Arniko Highway through Kodari, connecting Tibet with Nepal.
Despite these overtures, the Nepal–China relationship remained nuanced. Though the India-China relationship was broken following the conflict of 1962 and there was mistrust between India and King Mahendra’s regime, India and Nepal entered into an arms assistance agreement with regards to arms imports by Nepal in 19655. Further, Nepal did not seek the withdrawal of Indian forward military checkposts on the Nepal-Tibet border till 1969. Nepal also hosted some of the Khampa rebels in Mustang that were seeking to free Tibet militarily. It is only in 1974 that the Khampas were eventually neutralized by the Royal Nepal Army.
China, as a balancing hedge against India, gained salience for Nepal once again following the merger of Sikkim with India in 1974–75. Nepal responded with its Zone of Peace proposal, a policy of equidistance between its two neighbours, which gained some traction internationally but failed due to the strong opposition by India. Similarly, during the mass protests of Jan Andolan I in 1989 against the Panchayat system, the Palace tried to import anti-aircraft guns from China that led to the border blockade by India and the subsequent collapse of the Panchayat system.
Another occasion when Nepal made a serious outreach to China was following King Gyanendra’s political coup in February 2005 when he arrested political leaders and usurped all executive power. In response to India’s sharp criticism and suspension of military assistance, King Gyanendra threatened to, and indeed bought military supplies from China. He actively espoused, together with Pakistan, the full membership of China in SAARC even though he was fully aware of India’s strong reservations.
While it is true that, in the past, upswings in the Nepal-China relationship coincided with downswings in the Nepal-India relationship, it was a nuanced relationship. Even at the worst of times in the bilateral relationship, Nepal was generally sensitive to Indian security interests. Today, however, it appears to be moving ever closer to China as technology makes the Himalayas more easily passable and a wealthy China is eager to be a strategic partner.
This excerpt from Kathmandu Dilemma: Resetting India-Nepal Ties by Ranjit Rae has been published with the permission of Penguin Random House
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