One of the measures that was expected to provide thrust to the “Act East” policy was the reopening of the historic Stilwell Road that had linked North East India to China through northern Myanmar during World War II. Constructed under the guidance of an American commander, Gen Joseph Stilwell, after whom it was christened, the 1,079-km-long road was meant to ferry military supplies to aid the war efforts of the Chinese leader, Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese. However, with the end of the war the road fell into disrepair.
Attempts were made during the last decade — primarily by statesmen from the North East — to rebuild the road. Even an able presentation on the road was made by a minister of Assam in Dhaka during the Kunming Initiative in 2001, and it seemed that a momentum had gained when the then Minister for External Affairs, Jaswant Singh visited Myanmar in the same year and inked several proposals including the opening up of the Pangsau Pass in the Indo-Myanmar border for border trade. Indeed, there was active interest in the construction of an initial 230 Km stretch in the Stilwell Road from Ledo in Assam to Tanai in Myanmar’s Kachin state. The proposal had received a further boost during the visit of Myanmar’s then number two in the Tatmadaw, Gen. Maung Aye in April 2008.
But, despite the best efforts little headway was made. Indeed, hope of reopening the road ended with the statement by the then UPA ministry in the Lok Sabha that New Delhi has decided not to reopen the Stilwell Road. Although security concerns seem to have guided New Delhi’s decision, it has probably circumvented not only the imperative of development, but certain geostrategic considerations as well.
Without a passageway to dynamic South East Asia, the “Act East” policy will continue to be a strategy on paper. Indeed, it will never actually “Go East”! The development boom in India would have provided a flourishing market to the famished lands of Myanmar. This is being hazarded despite the civil strife that has overcome the country. As a matter of fact, the accent should be to reach out to the Tatmadaw – the visit by a high level delegation to Imphal seems to indicate that there is a silver lining in the relationship that had gone sour in the aftermath of the coup on 1 February 2021.
Indeed, an outlet into Myanmar and further afield by way of corridors like the Stilwell Road would also have been a favourable conduit for Indian business. Furthermore, it has been calculated that commerce plying on the Stilwell Road would have reduced transportation costs between India, Myanmar and China by 30 percent. Although alternative routes to and from Myanmar such as the ambitious Kaladan multi-nodal project, which would comprise a port, inland water facilities and a road connecting certain important places of Myanmar with India will hopefully take off sooner than later with the normalisation of relations between India and Myanmar, a cost-benefit analysis of the decision not to reopen the Stilwell Road opines that reconstruction of an existent road, albeit that has ailed due to disuse would have been less demanding. This author has traversed the road all the way from Ledo to the Pangsau Pass with the Assam Rifles, and found that tales about its rundown condition have been exaggerated. It is entirely motorable, even in the fiercest of monsoon season (when this author accepted an invitation to visit the area), and the road has more than adequate openings for the construction of not only commercial hubs, but tourism projects as well, especially in the annexes beyond misty Nampong. It is wondrous, therefore, that a project that would have connected the North East — and thereby the rest of India — to a new “kismet” should have been turned down.
The imperatives of security are vital, especially if it pertains to the borderland. One of the reasons for this author’s trip to Tirap and Changlang in Arunachal Pradesh was to glean the manner in which insurgency ingress into India takes place, particularly from the Myanmar Naga Hills (MNH). After all, it is a known fact that ULFA (Independent) continues to have a few camps in the area. Indeed, it is from the launching detachments of MNH that subterfuge used to enter the oil, coal and tea belts of Assam. Briefed at all level of competent authority — civil and military, and apprised on ground by company level Indian army officials, it was not too difficult to surmise that the entry point of the insurgents into Arunachal Pradesh was not through roads such as the Stilwell Road, but non-traditional (and ever-changing) routes that sought to circuit Indian border management provisions. The view that either insurgency or intimidating Chinese Armed Personnel Carriers would roll via the Stilwell Road into Arunachal Pradesh is inane, and the aspect that must take primacy is that development is an important factor of security.
The geostrategic setback of the decision to roll back on the Stilwell Road project relates to the “considerable interest” that China has shown in upgrading the Stilwell Road. Even as New Delhi closed the chapter on the Old Ledo Road, Chinese contracts had been awarded for the refurbishing of the Road right up to Pangsau Pass, which is a mere 61 Km from Ledo. It would be of interest to note that the information came into the open by way of a significant admission by the Defence Ministry during the UPA regime. It was also reported in the Press that the People’s Republic has constructed highways, defence installations and logistics centres in all military centres on the LAC. Reported in open source, it was stated that a parliamentary panel had “rapped the Defence Ministry (in the UPA government) for its complacency and not maintaining detailed data on activities going on across the international border particularly in China.” The upgradation of the Stilwell Road — particularly the 647 km Kunming-Myitkina stretch which traverses the Kambaiti Pass — was already completed by Chinese concerns in 2007. Furthermore, a Myanmarese construction company Ya Za Na Company with definite Chinese affiliations was entrusted with the task of constructing the 192 km stretch of the Stilwell Road between Myitkina and Tanai. The Defence Ministry Report of that time had also reportedly stated that contracts have been awarded for the construction of the 174 km Tanai-Pangsau length, a stretch that was taken up by Jaswant Singh’s 2001 visit to Myanmar as aforementioned, but which is now part of a Sino-Myanmarese design.
It would be of interest to Indian policy planners that Beijing has been investing billions of US dollars in Myanmar since the beginning of the last decade and a half. Indeed, its proximity with Naypyidaw has grown since the military takeover, majority of which is on military hardware and infrastructure. The investment included a $5 billion hydroelectric project, a $100 million modern airport in Naypyidaw and a 2,000 km rail link between Yangon and Kunming. The intense Chinese activity to connect Kunming with not only areas in Myanmar, but to the borders of India could well be the security concern that New Delhi’s mandarins are obsessed with. Only this time around, it is someone else that is constructing the concern.
Jaideep Saikia is a conflict theorist and bestselling author. Views expressed are personal.
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