War is the ultimate instrument of state power which is employed by a country as a last resort. Most responsible leaders would avoid taking their countries to war because of the human and material cost involved. Military weaknesses of a country may also motivate an adversary to use force to settle political or other issues. To counter such possibilities, it is felt that ‘defence preparedness’ is the best recipe for ‘war avoidance’.
The recent assault by Russia against Ukraine is a classic case of a stronger neighbour imposing its ‘will’ to achieve its goals. Large part of the world has criticised the Russian military action, but ultimately, Ukraine is left to defend herself using her own military assets. Connivance between Russia and Belarus is another aspect which merits attention by the Indian security establishment. Economic sanctions by the West will take their own time to have any impact on Russia, by which time damage to Ukrainian people and the country would have been done.
India shares unsettled borders with two nuclear neighbours who can connive against India. For a long time, the Indian security strategy worked on the premise that a two-front war could be avoided by handling one of the neighbours diplomatically. However, recent incidents and posturing have made ‘two-front conflict’ a possibility.
While diplomatic efforts to improve relations with the neighbours must continue, a detailed threat analysis would dictate force and equipment levels required to meet the challenges posed by the two adversaries individually or collectively.
India has been heavily dependent on imports for her critical weapons and equipment needs, and is the second-largest importer of defence equipment after Saudi Arabia. Heavy imports are not only a drain on precious foreign exchange reserves but also leave her vulnerable during a crisis. Even during the current Ukraine-Russia crisis, India is forced to sit on the fence and take neutral stance because she is heavily dependent on Russian weapons, equipment and spares.
Therefore, to have strategic freedom, India needs to be fully self-reliant in defence equipment and weapon systems. Only strong and self-reliant nations are taken seriously by the other world powers.
Reasons for heavy import dependence for defence equipment have primarily been absence of long-term policies, lack of strategic culture, inefficient defence PSUs, nonperforming Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and bureaucratic delays. Decision-makers are not held accountable for non-materialisation of even budgeted projects resulting in non-utilisation funds. It is no secret that the armed forces who are required to fight for the country have limited say in final decision making for acquisitions.
Aatmnirbharta (self-reliance) policies of the government are very well received but their implementation must not result in delays and procurement of poor-quality weapons and equipment from the defence PSUs. Development of light combat aircraft (LCA) and Arjun, main battle tank (MBT), have taken decades which highlight the shortcomings in our indigenisation programmes.
Aatmnirbharta projects/policies must be implemented innovatively holding all concerned accountable to deliver results in a time-bound manner without compromising quality. Countries take many decades to develop globally competitive defence industry. Hence, India would have to work very hard by taking extra ordinary innovative steps to achieve self-reliance in defence. Announcing policies will not suffice, there need to be results on the ground.
To comprehensively overcome the bureaucratic delays, there is an urgent need to integrate the military and bureaucracy. All bureaucrats must do at least one year compulsory military service at the beginning of their career in active military units and those who are likely to be involved in procurement must do periodic stints with armed forces and attend their professional courses so that they understand the ground realities.
Likewise, some officers from the services must be laterally inducted into the Ministry of Defence after about 15 years of service on a permanent basis so that they can make valuable contribution by becoming part of the procurement set up.
Unlike members of alliances like NATO, where members share the cost of defence preparedness, India is required to bear the high cost of maintaining standing armed forces who need to fight by themselves in the absence of an alliance.
It needs to be remembered that while groupings like QUAD may dominate the Indo-Pacific thus preventing misadventure by China at sea, dealing with China in the Himalayas would continue to be the job of the Indian armed forces alone. No other country could be expected to assist in this task. It has been repeatedly proved that Indian soldiers are more than a match to our northern or western adversaries, but the need for state-of-the-art weapons and equipment cannot be ignored or delayed.
A spending of about 2 to 3% of the GDP by a country is considered optimum to have the right balance between development and security. This is considered a justified annual premium for a country’s national security. Unfortunately, India’s defence budget as percentage of the GDP has been shrinking over the years and currently stands at about 2% which surely leaves voids in acquisitions. Needless to say that defence preparedness must be backed by a robust economy so that development and welfare of the citizens are not compromised.
Recommended way forward for India’s security set up is — firstly, a well-developed indigenous defence industry is a pre-requisite to make India a self-reliant military power. Incentives to manufacture and export would make Indian defence industry competitive at the global stage as also achieve economies of scale.
Secondly, to beat the technology learning curve, transfer of technology, competitive research and development and active participation of private sector is a necessity to produce weapons and equipment of international standards. Second rung equipment would be a big liability.
Thirdly, high rate of economic growth for a sustained period is a must for the country to support military modernisation. Remember, there are no runners-up in war.
The author was head of Army Service Corps. He is a distinguished fellow at United Service Institution of India and a motivational and leadership speaker. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the stand of this publication.
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