SAARCs in the water: A minefield Modi must negotiate in South Asia
SAARCs in the water: A minefield Modi must negotiate in South Asia
We examine some of the difficulties India's new regime will have to keep in mind while dealing with its neighbours.

Like he said in his victory speech in Vadodara, remarks made by Narendra Modi in the heat of elections do not have much meaning afterwards. After several inflammatory statements by Giriraj Singh and co., and his own express intent of doing an Abbotabad on Dawood Ibrahim, Modi has invited SAARC leaders, including Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for his swearing-in ceremony. Formal events apart, the new government in Delhi will have to negotiate complex and interconnected relationships in the neighbourhood.

Unlike, say, a new government in a European country, or North America, a new government in India has to consider the fact that the neighbourhood is, not to put too fine a point on it, a minefield. Every country is involved in some way or the other in contentious religious, ethnic or territorial matters with the other. Consider the matter of enclaves - little patches of a country within the territorial limits of another country. The most complex set of enclaves happen to be between the Dutch and the Belgians, but they have managed it amicably for the last two hundred years. But India has enclaves in Bangladesh, sometimes enclaves within enclaves, and resolving them opens some really big cans of worms. We examine some of the difficulties the new regime will have to keep in mind.

Pakistan: The big one, something which deserves its own article. Modi has taken the clever step of inviting Nawaz Sharif, leaving the latter in a dilemma. If he comes to Delhi, he will be thumbing his nose at the military-intelligence bosses, not mention the religious hardliners. If he doesn't, Sharif will appear churlish on an international stage. But bigger issues will also need to be tackled sometime soon.

Kashmir is divided and the Pakistan government is not going to weaken its stand on the Kashmir that is in India. Terror camps in PoK will be another matter that needs to be negotiated unless we want to see a return to the brinkmanship of 2001-02 after the attack on Parliament. Dawood Ibrahim is a separate category that we would all like to see a solution to. But that can only begin if Pakistan admits he's in there somewhere.

But there's more than just bilateral matters. A post-Western intervention Afghanistan will be ripe for overtures by India, while Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment will not let go of its search for strategic depth. All it needs is another attack on Indian interests by the Taliban and we will have to decide whether to be proactive at wooing the Afghans or sit back and let Pakistan make gains there, as in previous regimes. As with any other stage in history, Afghanistan won't be a topic India can afford to ignore for its own strategic interests.

One way to do this would be to help the Afghans underwrite their security. But is India robust enough to do it? When India was likely to go the nuclear way in 1965, then Pak premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said "we will eat grass or leaves" and become a nuclear power regardless of the cost to the nation. He was echoing the country's willingness to go one up on India at any rate. India will have to decide whether to build strength in the short term or tackle Pakistan's strategic challenge immediately.

Sri Lanka: One would think that, compared to Pakistan, Sri Lanka is hardly worth the bother. But repercussions from that country have a more immediate domestic connection. As we write, there are already rumbles from Tamil Nadu: Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa might miss out on Modi's swearing-in ceremony because Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapakse has been invited. There is no love lost between Tamil politicians and the Lankan strongman, who might actually see eye to eye with Modi on bilateral issues because both have extensive support bases within their respective countries and have built a strong nationalistic image. In Rajapakse's case, the treatment of the Tamil minority after the last Eelam War and the destruction of the LTTE remains a very significant blot he would rather not discuss. Any proximity of India with the Sinhalas without addressing the Tamil issue will not go well with Modi's numerous Tamil allies, not good news if the NDA wants to make inroads in Tamil Nadu anytime soon. There is also the unresolved issue of Sri Lankan Army war crimes and concentration camps for Tamils. The Norwegians can visit Sri Lanka and make any comment they want. After all, they don't live in the neighbourhood. India does.

Bangladesh: Another festering mess here, beginning with illegal immigrants, border fencing, stricter visa regime, and Modi's open invitation to Bangladeshi Hindus (numbering nearly 10 million) seeking asylum from persecution. How these ideological promises translate into policy will be closely watched. Bangladesh has also been growing ever closer to Pakistan, and India's Bangladesh policy, including reviewing our water-sharing agreement with them (necessary if the proposed river-linking projects ever reach the drawing board) will need to be very cleverly crafted.

Nepal: Religious bonhomie apart, the country is fraying at the edges and kicking out their king had very little impact on pushing the nation along a stable democratic path. The Maoists are sulking and still have their weapons, no charismatic democratic leader has emerged, anti-India sentiment cuts across party and social lines, and China has been making attractive economic overtures. All it needs is a big dam or two and some highways, and we will have another ambivalent, if not actively hostile, neighbour. The new government has to play a peacemaking role here, perhaps encourage democratic institutions to take stronger roots without appearing to be an interfering regional Big Brother (which is how their politicians would have their voters see India).

Bhutan: Probably the best news in the region. The country made a smooth transition to democracy and is doing well. India will continue its active economic and military cooperation here. The one thing to watch out for would be to help Bhutan deal with its own migrant problem. Its demography is exceptionally fragile and liable to rupture at the slightest pressure, and India wouldn't want instability in the mountains any more than the Bhutanese would.

Maldives: A case of a long-standing ally suddenly showing an internal malaise. Peaceful mass protests which began in 2011 eventually snowballed into President Nasheed resigning the following year under circumstances which could be called a coup. Former president Maumoon Gayoom, not the first person you would expect to champion democracy considering his decades of iron control over the islands, criticised Nasheed's inability to encourage democracy to flourish. The problems which caused mass protests - a bad economy and inflation - have since grown more dire, and Islamic fundamentalism appears to be on the rise.

India needs to take an active part in stabilising the country. The word 'coup' and Maldives bring back memories of 1988 and the infernal mess of a coup by a Maldivian militia group and the Sri Lankan Tamil separatist organisation PLOTE, an event from an Indian diplomat's most feverish nightmare. The coup was stopped by the Indian armed forces' Operation Cactus, but one hopes a repeat does not occur. Local politics involves equidistance from big powers and benevolent intervention is not always taken in its stride by all countries. Another case for tightrope diplomacy.

Myanmar: Not a SAARC member, Myanmar does enjoy Observer status, along with China, Iran and other neighbours. But since it borders both Bangladesh and India, relations with it need to be carefully calibrated. Previous Indian regimes have had on-off relationships with Myanmar. Despite promoting democratic values, India has not sufficiently criticised the repressive junta or its genocide of tribal minorities including the Kachins and Karens. Nor has India offered more than a very tepid support for Aung San Suu Kyi. It is unlikely that this policy will change anytime soon.

The junta however has been very welcoming to international business interests, including from China. While promoting India's business ventures in Myanmar will be a welcome step, as a responsible democracy we will also need to raise concerns over economic exploitation and ethnic cleansing in Myanmar's tribal homelands, which just happen to be extremely resource-rich, and also send out a quiet word or two about the junta's involvement in the narcotics trade, which directly affects India.

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